

Preparing for One War and Getting Another?

Antulio J. Echevarria II

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PREPARING FOR ONE WAR AND GETTING ANOTHER?

Antulio J. Echevarria II

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
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FOREWORD

When Edward Luttwak's *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* was published in 1987, it drew the attention of the defense intellectual community almost immediately, and became required reading in many strategy courses. The idea that war or strategy was driven by a paradoxical logic was attractive. However, a number of questions remain unanswered. If war has its own logic, rather than its own grammar, where does the logic of policy fit in? If the logic of strategy is, in fact, paradoxical, how can it be taught? What are paradoxes, and can they be useful in guiding our strategic choices?

All of these questions and more are touched upon in this monograph by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II. He takes a closer look at the seemingly paradoxical logic that is driving aspects of defense thinking today. While the need for certain capabilities may indeed be genuine, the manner in which the arguments for them are made can actually undermine the overall rationale for change.

This monograph will be an essential counterpart to any course in which the paradoxical logic of strategy is discussed.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
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SUMMARY

Current trends in defense thinking show signs of being influenced by the notion that preparing for one form of war has brought about another. We find evidence of this notion in a number of official speeches, the 2008 *National Defense Strategy*, and the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. It is captured in the almost routine claim that America's superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for which we have not prepared—precisely because we have not prepared for them. Thus, the modern complement—a preparation paradox—to the old Latin adage “If you want peace, prepare for war,” might well be “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.”

Paradoxical propositions of this sort have a certain intellectual appeal: they are keen and pithy, and thus are frequently used in debates. Edward Luttwak's classic work, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, attempted to argue that the realm of strategy is full of paradoxical propositions. However, embracing any paradox is rarely a good idea. This one rests on at least two questionable premises. The first of these is the assumption that America's broad range of foes or potential foes can be grouped together. They cannot. Second, the preparation paradox assumes that substantive change is easier for our foes than it is for us, but the evidence actually points in the opposite direction.

Dissolving Paradoxes.

Paradoxes are intellectually intriguing, but they are almost always resolved by rigorous logical analysis. That was true of Luttwak's basic argument regarding war's supposed self-contradictory propositions, and it is true of the apparent paradox influencing defense thinking today. Eventually, we either find (1) the essential item of information that reconciles the contradictory statements, or (2) that the premises of one or all statements are false, or (3) that the paradox only seemed valid because we initially made hasty generalizations.

Dissolving Strategic Paradoxes.

In his classic work, Luttwak maintained that "strategy is governed by a contradictory, paradoxical, contrarian logic," and that this is true at all levels of war. However, his argument is an example of attempting to identify independent variables within a dynamic environment that is, instead, made up of innumerable dependent ones. Military operations depend on a larger, overriding logic, which is, at root, political. Creating paradoxes out of difficult dilemmas, or risky trade-offs, or the use of indirect methods is not analytically useful. If historical analysis has any value, then we have to admit that exogenous factors are always at work in war. It is not an independent activity with its own logic. The grammar of war, which is often confused with logic, is eminently linear. For instance, logistical requirements – and the consequences of not meeting them – are patently linear.

In fact, the phrase "if you want peace, prepare for war" is an irony, not a paradox. That is to say that it

is not a rule or a principle, but a clever way of saying “if you want peace, make yourself strong enough to deter an attack.” As one prominent logician noted, for example, it “is ironic [rather than paradoxical] that the competent general must both protect his soldiery and endanger them by use, and that he cannot do the one without forgoing the other;” similarly, it “is ironic [rather than paradoxical] that the individual soldier cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk.”¹ Again, this logic is all precisely linear: the supposed paradoxes dissolve once we realize that the link connecting the seemingly contradictory statements is the concept of risk—accepting that mission accomplishment or self fulfillment requires a certain exposure to harm. The idea that war has a paradoxical logic only emerges when war is stripped of its political context, that is, when its grammar is mistaken for a distinct and overriding logic.

Dissolving the Preparation Paradox.

Just as Luttwak’s self-contradictory propositions are dissolvable, so too is the apparent paradoxical logic driving the argument that America’s superiority in conventional conflict is pushing its enemies into irregular warfare. The underlying assumption is that strength in one area only comes at the cost of weakness in another; or that preparing for today’s challenges tends to create tomorrow’s vulnerabilities. To be clear, it is not paradoxical to attempt to redress a shortfall in capabilities, as the U.S. military has done in recent months with its increased focus on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. However, it is paradoxical to do so if our efforts would be counterproductive, which is what the contrarian logic of the preparation paradox suggests.

As noted at the outset, the preparation paradox rests on the flawed assumption that America's broad range of enemies can be grouped together. Like any major power, the United States has numerous adversaries and competitors arrayed at various points along the threat spectrum. Many of them, especially violent nonstate actors, have from the start employed irregular methods for important reasons, and are not likely to abandon them, regardless of U.S. strengths.

Violent Nonstate Threats. A closer look at some contemporary nonstate threats—such as al-Qaeda and other violent jihadi groups, various criminal gangs, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia* (FARC), and other insurgent organizations—confirms that they have not fundamentally changed their methods, though their targets and priorities have clearly shifted over time.

State Competitors. Like the United States, a number of contemporary state actors maintain some capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. However, we are more likely to see cases where ways of war are refined rather than changed in a comprehensive or revolutionary way. Whereas military conservatism was touted as the principal reason for such outcomes, the real culprits were strong strategic traditions, coupled with compelling domestic interests. Studies of the 2006 war in Lebanon illustrate that historical forces can exert a correcting influence on military change. Prior to the 2006 campaign, the Israeli army shifted its training and procurement efforts away from conventional, joint combined arms operations toward low-intensity conflict and counterterrorism. However, Hezbollah presented a challenge that required competence in conventional operations; as a result of critical assessments done in the aftermath of the war, the Israeli

army shifted its efforts back toward developing competency in joint combined arms operations.

Perhaps a more telling example is China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), which since the 1980s has attempted to modernize while retaining the basic doctrine of People's War, which is characterized by an emphasis on manpower and protracted, but limited, conflict. Through an evolutionary series of revolutions, the PLA continues to integrate more high-tech weaponry and information technology, as well as a series of "new" doctrinal concepts designed to optimize them in practice. In sum, the Chinese military appears to be following a modernization trajectory that will turn it into an effective, high-tech, joint military organization, rather than a force that would shift direction and re-embrace the guerrilla model.

The brief survey here has shown that revolutionary change—that is, moving from one part of the spectrum of conflict to the other—is as rare among nonstate actors as it is among states. Even if the U.S. military had not demonstrated its superiority at conventional war in the early 1990s, few of our adversaries would have challenged it in that realm for important political and cultural reasons. Most were employing irregular methods well before the 1990s, a fact that in some ways should make them more dangerous since, presumably, they have had more time to become proficient. The rub is that U.S. opponents need not change radically in order to identify and attack any number of U.S. vulnerabilities. Thus, it makes more sense for the U.S. military to approach conventional and irregular warfare not as separate kinds of conflicts, but as different priorities within the larger activity of war itself.

While the U.S. military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle, it is still developing fluency

in the language of war. Embracing the preparation paradox would only harm this effort. As we have seen, the premises of the paradox are invalid; however, they have contributed to shaping many of the debates within defense circles today. For that reason, it is important to examine them, and to understand why they are faulty. Just as the saying “If you want peace, prepare for war” is little more than an irony, so too is its modern-day complement “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.” Neither can really serve as a guide for action. The problem is that some propositions remain persuasive long after they have been stripped of any semblance of logic.

ENDNOTE

1. Nicholas Rescher, *Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution*, Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2001, p. 7.

PREPARING FOR ONE WAR AND GETTING ANOTHER?

The ancient Latin saying “If you want peace, prepare for war,” was the starting point for Edward Luttwak’s classic work, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*.¹ Luttwak attempted to argue that the realm of strategy is full of paradoxical propositions such as this one. If current trends in defense thinking continue, this famous adage might soon have a modern complement: “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.” We can find several versions of this paradoxical proposition already at work in defense literature today. Conspicuous examples include the arguments for developing additional capabilities for irregular warfare, which routinely claim that America’s superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. As U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently noted: “our enemies and potential adversaries—including nation states—have gone to school on us,” and are thus moving away from conventional toward irregular means.² Another version of the same paradoxical logic appears in the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* with respect to asymmetric means. That document declared: “U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages.”³ The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* revealed a similar rationale with respect to the history of U.S. military preparedness by stating: “the wars we fight are seldom the wars we would have planned.”⁴ The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are thus only the most recently cited illustrations of this apparent tendency to prepare

inappropriately. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for which we are not prepared—precisely because we have not prepared for them. Regardless of where one stands on the issue of irregular capabilities, it is clear that a preparation paradox—the belief that preparing for one type of conflict has merely increased the likelihood of having to fight a very different one—has taken root in defense thinking.

Paradoxical propositions of this sort have a certain intellectual appeal: they are keen and pithy, and thus are frequently used in debates. This proposition in particular is intended to offer a rationale for change, and it seems to do so because one of warfare's time-honored assumptions is that belligerents prefer to attack weaknesses rather than strengths. However, embracing any paradox is rarely a good idea. The logic of a true paradox is, by definition, contradictory and, thus, unlikely to stand up to closer inspection. This is also the case with the preparation paradox, which actually sets up an endless cycle in which our efforts to change work against one another: if we become strong in conventional conflict, our foes will shift their efforts toward unconventional means; if we shift to unconventional capabilities to compensate, our adversaries will shift back toward conventional methods. In other words, our efforts to build strength in one area will invariably invite our foes to attack us in another. Instead of succumbing to this cycle, we would do better to cultivate strength at one end of the spectrum, presumably the conventional end where the stakes are often highest, and expend only minimal effort to manage risk elsewhere. Obviously, in so doing we reject the original rationale for change.

Fortunately, we can dissolve the preparation paradox because it rests on at least two questionable premises. The first of these is the assumption that America's broad range of foes or potential foes can be grouped together. They cannot. Each of them possesses a unique combination of capabilities, and maintains them for their own important political, economic, and cultural reasons. In fact, most of the parties pursuing irregular methods now were doing so well before American expertise at conventional conflict became evident, as it so clearly did during the 1990-91 campaign in the Persian Gulf. Second, the preparation paradox assumes that substantive change is easier for our foes than it is for us, but the evidence actually points in the opposite direction. Change is arguably as difficult for our competitors as it is for us for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it tends to run against established cultures and traditions. Also, while we might wish to believe that our competitors will react to whatever we do, they must, in fact, always consider how any significant change might alter their power relationships with other regional or global competitors. Their freedom of action is, thus, limited in important ways.

DISSOLVING PARADOXES

Paradoxes are intellectually intriguing, but they are almost always resolved by rigorous logical analysis. As we shall see, that was true of Luttwak's basic argument regarding war's supposed self-contradictory propositions, and it is true of the apparent paradox influencing defense thinking today. Eventually, we either find (1) the essential item of information that reconciles the contradictory statements, or (2) that the premises of one or all statements are false, or (3) that

the paradox only seemed valid because we initially made hasty generalizations.⁵ The Birthday Paradox is an example of the first. It is simply the apparent impossibility that an individual who has reached the age of 21, has only had five birthdays. The resolution comes when we realize that the individual was born on February 29, and thus has only had five true birthdays.⁶

The Barber Paradox is a classic example of the second. It involves a certain village:

in which there is a barber who shaves all and only those men in the village who do not shave themselves. Query: does the barber shave himself? Any man in this village is shaved by the barber if and only if he is not shaved by himself. Therefore the barber in particular shaves himself if and only if he does not.⁷

Thus, we have an apparent paradox. Fortunately, the paradox rests on a faulty premise, namely, that such a barber could exist at all. We can see that such a premise is absurd, and that thus the query does not warrant an answer. The paradox itself serves as proof that no such barber could exist; some philosophers refer to this method of exposing a faulty premise as a form of *reductio ad absurdum* because it involves stripping the paradox to its simplest form to expose the logical flaw that created it in the first place.⁸

There is another class of paradox that consists of rhetorical or semantic contradictions. These are linguistic sleights of hand or attempts to exploit the pliability of language to construct statements that are grammatically correct, but completely nonsensical. It is tempting to see these as potentially soluble puzzles, or brain teasers, but they are not. They are in a class of paradox that we may call trivial. The Liar's Paradox is

perhaps the most famous and most enduring of these; it is a single statement: "This sentence is false." The problem is that if the statement is true, then it cannot be false, which it says that it is. Yet, if it is false, as it claims to be, then it is true, which it says that it is not. Thus, the paradox. In fact, the contradiction is simply not resolvable as written, though philosophers and logicians have and will continue to try.⁹ It simply shows that language can be manipulated to create false paradoxes. Fortunately, strategists need not bother with this class of paradox; their concern is with logical paradoxes, as in the first example.

Dissolving Strategic Paradoxes.

In his classic work, Luttwak maintained that "strategy is governed by a contradictory, paradoxical, contrarian logic," and that this is true at all levels of war.¹⁰ Indeed, he attempted to prove that a paradoxical logic is operative in all major strategic, operational, tactical, and technical principles. He described the logic "in its totality as the *coming together, even the reversal, of opposites*;" it is manifest "*in all that is strategical, in all that is characterized by the struggle of adversary wills*." In the realm of strategy, "a course of action cannot persist indefinitely" because it "will tend to evolve into its opposite, unless the logic of strategy is outweighed by some *exogenous change* in the circumstances of the participants." In short, the paradoxical logic of strategy induces a "self-negating evolution."¹¹

To illustrate how this logic works, Luttwak borrowed examples from history: Germany's invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in 1940; the German offensive into the Soviet Union in 1941; the Soviet counteroffensives of 1942, 1943, and 1944-45; the North

African campaigns of 1941-43; the advance of the western Allies across France in 1944; and the campaigns in Korea in 1950 and 1951. All of these campaigns were intended to illustrate how Clausewitz's "culminating point of victory"—the idea that an army's advance can exceed its ability to sustain itself—is an example of paradoxical logic, specifically, that, barring the introduction of external factors, success can only extend so far before it fails. In other words, a victorious military force would have to "pause and recuperate from its own successful advance" in order to overcome the attritional effects of strategic consumption.¹² Luttwak also extended this phenomenon to the political dimension, arguing that, as one achieves victory after victory, one's allies and partners begin to fear for their own security and start to realign themselves so as to undermine or contain the successful party. It would seem, then, that the familiar cliché is in fact true: success does indeed contain the seeds of its own demise.

However, Luttwak's argument is an example of attempting to identify independent variables within a dynamic environment that is instead made up of innumerable dependent ones. To be sure, it is tempting to regard attack and defense as discrete and opposite forms of war; but, they depend on a larger, overriding logic, which is, at root, political. Moreover, equilibrium is rarely present in the sense that transitioning from one form of war to another can be said to occur as a sequence of corresponding trade-offs. Instead, when we consider the details—such as how an opponent's army might be on the defensive while its air force and navy are on the offensive, or how forces in reserve are neither attacking nor defending, or how an advancing column must maintain an all-round defensive posture as it attacks—the premises that brought the paradox into being begin to dissolve, and rather quickly.

Creating paradoxes out of difficult dilemmas, or risky trade-offs, or the use of indirect methods is not analytically useful. If historical analysis has any value, then we have to admit that exogenous factors are always at work in war. Hitler's invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in 1940 was facilitated by the Allies' failure to interdict German supply columns, which were tied up in massive traffic jams throughout the Ardennes forest.¹³ To that error must be added the Allies' failure to execute a potentially crippling counterattack at the French town of Arras. An opponent's errors of omission and commission, in other words, would appear to be critical to the outcome of any campaign, but they are exogenous factors with respect to the logic of strategy as Luttwak defines it.

Regarding the German offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941, tremendous resources were stripped away from the invading military forces to implement Nazi policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide; moreover, opportunities to draw some of the Soviet states from Moscow politically, and thus weaken Stalin, were shunned by the Reich's leadership.¹⁴ Put differently, we could add attitudes of racial superiority and hubris to the exogenous factors that influenced Germany's planning for the campaign; or we could ask at what point in a campaign is the military or strategic logic overcome by the political logic that established the purpose for the war in the first place. This question is also germane to the campaigns in North Africa from 1941-42, which the political leadership on both sides saw as little more than marginal until late 1942.¹⁵

Moreover, the operational pauses the Red Army made in its series of counteroffensives in 1944-45 owed much to an overriding political logic, namely, that Stalin sought to establish and consolidate his hold on eastern Europe; the clearest example of this was his

decision to halt the Red Army just near the Vistula in the summer of 1944 to allow the Germans to put down the Warsaw uprising, destroy the *Armia Krajowa*, and thus weaken the influence of the Polish government in exile.¹⁶ In addition, considerable exogenous momentum influenced the power equation, as former German allies, such as Romania, changed sides in the last year of the war. Such events undermine Luttwak's argument by giving credence to the adage that success breeds success, while also confounding efforts to isolate the hypothetical intrinsic logic of military operations. Likewise, we should not underestimate the role that political logic played with respect to the Korean conflict, particularly as the Truman administration shifted its goals in the spring of 1951, almost in mid-stride, in order to avoid lateral escalation and to put a ceiling on U.S efforts.¹⁷

Logistical requirements—and the consequences of not meeting them—are patently linear. Despite an accumulation of knowledge over centuries, knowing how far one can push one's troops and equipment in a campaign is still more art than science.¹⁸ The potential consequences of overstretch, whether operational or political in nature, are quite linear; in fact, the likely reactions to any outstanding successes—whether concerning individuals or larger bodies—are for all intents and purposes remarkably predictable. That states would put their own interests first is hardly surprising. What would be surprising, actually, is to discover when success ever consistently bred success. Likewise, violating common sense or taking risks to gain an advantage or taking certain actions to deter other actions is not paradoxical, but perfectly logical. And the logic itself is not contrarian or contradictory, but demonstrably linear. Closer analysis reveals,

therefore, that the logic of culmination is not genuinely paradoxical.

For Luttwak, a strategic logic that is not paradoxical would look something like: “if you want peace, prepare for peace.” This is indeed linear logic, or what Luttwak also referred to as common sense. Interestingly, linear logic often suffices simply because it does make sense. Preparing for peace – that is, disarming or agreeing to limit arms – does in some cases lead to, or perpetuate, peace. However, the adage: “if you want peace, prepare for war” also appears to suffice from the standpoint of deterring aggression; one could argue that this was, in fact, the strategic logic that prevailed throughout the Cold War. Yet, the paradoxical logic of preparing for war to get peace often does not work: instead of contributing to peace, it does the opposite by promoting an arms race, which even if it does not lead directly to war, does heighten tensions and raise the costs of diplomatic errors. Preparing for war did just that in the decades before 1914, when the world’s first three-dimensional arms race (air, land, and sea) occurred.¹⁹ The arms race did not cause World War I, but it clearly set the stage. Recent scholarship on the arms race that preceded World War II points to a similar conclusion.²⁰

In fact, the phrase “if you want peace, prepare for war” is an irony, not a paradox. That is to say, it is not a rule or a principle, but rather a clever way of saying “if you want peace, make yourself strong enough to deter an attack.” As one prominent logician noted, for example, it “is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the competent general must both protect his soldiery and endanger them by use, and that he cannot do the one without forgoing the other;” similarly, it “is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the individual soldier

cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk.”²¹ Again, this logic is all precisely linear: the supposed paradoxes dissolve once we realize that the link connecting the seemingly contradictory statements is the concept of risk—accepting that mission accomplishment or self fulfillment requires a certain exposure to harm. The idea that war has a paradoxical logic only emerges when war is stripped of its political context, that is, when its grammar is mistaken for a distinct and overriding logic.

Dissolving the Preparation Paradox.

Just as Luttwak’s self-contradictory propositions are dissolvable, so, too, is the apparent paradoxical logic driving the argument that America’s superiority in conventional conflict is pushing its enemies into irregular warfare. The underlying assumption is that strength in one area only comes at the cost of weakness in another; or that preparing for today’s challenges tends to create tomorrow’s vulnerabilities. As mentioned earlier, if it is true that our demonstrated strength in one end of the spectrum of conflict is pushing our opponents toward the other end, then as our capabilities in irregular warfare improve, we must expect that our foes will begin to move back toward conventional means, that is, away from our strength. Yet, again, as we respond by shifting more resources back toward conventional warfare, we must expect that our adversaries will swing once again toward irregular conflict. Unfortunately, with fiscal constraints becoming ever more acute, the obvious solution of trying to improve our capabilities across the spectrum of conflict will not hold up.²² We will likely have to prioritize the development of capabilities in one part of the spectrum at a time.

To be clear, it is not paradoxical to attempt to redress a shortfall in capabilities, as the U.S. military has done in recent months with its increased focus on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. However, it is paradoxical to do so if our efforts would be counterproductive, which is what the contrarian logic of the preparation paradox suggests. If we accept its premise that our opponents can and will shift priorities from one end of the spectrum to the other depending on our actions, then it would make better sense, fiscally and otherwise, for us to cultivate our expertise in conventional wars, while managing risk at the other end of the spectrum. After all, major conventional wars might only come once or twice per century, but they tend to involve the highest stakes. This logic obviously runs counter to the rationale for developing additional irregular capabilities; in fact, it turns it on its head.

However, as noted at the outset, the preparation paradox rests on the flawed assumption that America's broad range of enemies can be grouped together. Like any major power, the United States has numerous adversaries and competitors arrayed at various points along the threat spectrum. Many of them, especially violent nonstate actors, have from the start employed irregular methods for important reasons, and are not likely to abandon them, regardless of U.S. strengths. To be sure, irregular warfare remains a conscious and sensible choice for many small groups given their resources. But more than that, the organizations, cultures, and narratives that they built around this type of armed conflict over the course of decades now work against radical change. For these reasons, revolutionary change for nonstate actors is, arguably, more difficult than it would be for a major power such as the United States, which already has capabilities arrayed, in some depth, across the spectrum of conflict.

Violent Nonstate Threats. A closer look at some contemporary nonstate threats—such as al-Qaeda and other violent jihadi groups, various criminal gangs, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), and other insurgent organizations—confirms that they have not fundamentally changed their methods, though their targets and priorities have clearly shifted over time. They still use violence both directly and indirectly (sometimes with precision and sometimes indiscriminately) to create instability, to weaken and eventually depose certain regimes, and to replace them when possible.²³ For instance, al-Qaeda’s targets and priorities have shifted in accordance with its intentions to seek revolutionary change by means of a “defensive Jihad” involving “military, economic, and cultural-moral” dimensions.²⁴ Still, since the group’s apparent origins in 1988, its tactics have essentially evolved into and remained those of the guerrilla and the terrorist, and that holds true for its numerous offshoots and affiliates as well.²⁵ We can find evidence of the former in the mujahedeen’s campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, as well as many of the tactics employed against Coalition forces in Iraq. We can see the latter in the attempt to topple the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks against the U.S. Embassy in East Africa in 1998 and the USS *Cole* in 2000, and those of September 11, 2001, as well as the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London on July 7, 2005.²⁶ Indeed, the guerrilla-terrorist model is a flexible one in which the range of violence can run the gamut from ambushes or direct assaults against military units to suicide attacks against innocent non-combatants in major urban centers. It does, however, require extensive manipulation of information, which clearly has been made easier by the recent explosion of information technologies.²⁷

Nonetheless, al-Qaeda and the larger jihadi movement, of which it is more or less a part, is not only decentralized, but actually politically divided. Jihadi leaders, for instance, actively compete for recruits and political influence, while an underlying tension persists between jihadi ideologues and foot soldiers.²⁸ No form of centralized command structure has emerged that can consistently link acts of violence to political aims, or bridge the gaps between jihadi strategists and fighters. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that a rudimentary form of jihadi operational art is developing, inspired more or less by the writings of Abu Musab al Suri, to compensate in part for the group's political divisions and the lack of unity of effort among its branches.²⁹ The competition among the leaders is such that the fragmentation is likely to continue. This trend ensures that the task of combating al-Qaeda and similar groups will remain a complex one, but it continues to reward the time-honored strategy of divide and conquer. At the same time, the divisions themselves work against the possibility that a radical shift *in* methods will occur, even as they make it more likely that vexing adjustments *within* methods will take place.

To be sure, the threats posed by violent nonstate actors neither begin nor end with the jihadi movement. There is what some scholars perceive as a growing gang phenomenon, for instance, a term that refers to the many street gangs and transnational criminal organizations, which appear to have greater mobility and influence today than previously, thanks in part to the development of information and transportation technologies.³⁰ These groups are believed to consist of "first-, second-, and third-generation street gangs, Mafia families, illegal drug traffickers, warlords, ter-

rorists, and insurgents,” and often pose an indirect, but real threat to state security and sovereignty.³¹ First-generation gangs are said to have a turf orientation, while second-generation gangs are defined as those concerned with conducting business and only those political objectives that facilitate the generation of revenue; third-generation gangs, by comparison, are mercenary in orientation, and pursue explicit political and social ends, sometimes independently and sometimes at the behest of a state. While it might be tempting to classify this phenomenon as a new type of insurgency, doing so might only further obscure our understanding of what is actually taking place.³²

Due in part to Iraq’s fluctuating security situation, we can find examples of all of the types of groups there that are said to make up the gang phenomenon. Iraq appears to have offered what some scholars refer to as a “criminal opportunity space,” which various insurgent groups, militias, political parties, and tribes have exploited to advance their agendas more effectively.³³ Organized crime in Iraq did not emerge in response to the Coalition victory and subsequent occupation; but rather appears to have had “deep roots in an authoritarian and corrupt state subject to international sanctions,” and perhaps even much earlier than that.³⁴ Further research might well reveal that organized crime has been thriving for many decades. While many groups in the contemporary gang phenomenon appear interested primarily in profit, they also seem to have realized that political power and control of territory offered ways to enhance profit. Hence, they set out to “neutralize, control, or depose governments” to achieve the freedom of action and favorable environments they needed in order to conduct “business.”³⁵

The Coalition's failure to recognize and prepare for the extent and influence of organized crime in Iraq was clearly a strategic mistake. That a tenuous alliance of sorts or a loose system of cooperation might develop between criminal gangs and any resistance movement or insurgency should not have come as a surprise; nor is it surprising that distinctions between criminals and insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan would often prove to be dubious, and that their networks often meshed or overlapped together with multiple funding streams.³⁶ Analysts generally agree that the migration of former Iraqi soldiers into various insurgent groups could have been mitigated.³⁷ In fact, had the Coalition moved more decisively during the first few months when "most of the insurgent activities were rather episodic, badly organized, and ineffective," the growth of the insurgency might have been curbed.³⁸ Perhaps, as some analysts suggest, Washington's perceptions regarding the U.S. military's ability to adapt contributed to the decision to accept risk with regard to post-conflict operations in Iraq.³⁹ Still, consciously deciding not to prepare for certain contingencies because doing so might be too costly politically is qualitatively different from failing to prepare because the contingencies were not foreseen in the first place.

Some sources suggest that a "cyclical sharing network" emerged in Iraq with Iraqi Shi'a groups using and refining the development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambush techniques, which they received from or were trained in by Lebanon's Hezbollah and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), or Quds Force; then the Shi'a groups report the results of these innovations back to Hezbollah and the Quds Force for incorporation into training programs and further dissemination and transmission

elsewhere, such as to the Taliban.⁴⁰ There has been consistent evidence that Iran has backed Hezbollah and to some extent Hamas, and more recently a number of Shi'a groups in Iraq, though this was earlier disputed.⁴¹ Presumably, Iran limits the cycle in part due to resource constraints, but also in part to avoid provoking the United States, or inspiring an anti-Iranian backlash among Arab populations.⁴² Nonetheless, the use of irregular forces has long been an important way for Iran to exert influence in the region. That approach is likely to continue, regardless of how extensive American efforts are in expanding its irregular capabilities, and whether or not Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons.

Another obvious example of a violent nonstate actor that deserves discussion is the FARC. According to some, it became a major political factor in Colombia only because the narcotics trade provided the resources necessary for the group to thrive.⁴³ The FARC grew from an organization of approximately 2,000 guerrilla fighters in 1982, to about 5,000 fighters by 1990, and to some 15,000-20,000 guerrillas by 2000.⁴⁴ In short, over the course of 2 decades, it expanded in size by an order of magnitude, established more than 60 "fronts" (units of 60 to 400 personnel), and acquired the capacity to conduct mobile warfare and to engage in combat with regular military units of equal size. Its influence had grown so much that some experts were prepared to write Colombia off as a narco-state. The FARC's repertoire of tactics falls within the guerrilla-terrorist model, which is to say it includes guerrilla and small-unit conventional operations, car bombings, torture, assassination, kidnapping, hijacking, and extortion. By these means, it terrorized and intimidated or coerced government officials and the

general public. In 2000, a former Colombian minister of defense reported: "In the last 15 years . . . four presidential candidates, 200 judges and investigators, and half the Supreme Court's justices, 1,200 police officers, 151 journalists, and more than 300,000 ordinary Colombians have been murdered."⁴⁵

Interestingly, after less than a decade, some analysts are now referring to Colombia as a success story—the "Colombian Miracle"—because the power and influence of the FARC have been significantly diminished.⁴⁶ The United States Southern Command, for instance, recently reported that the FARC "has been reduced to an estimated 9,000 fighters," less than half its estimated strength in 2002, and the areas it controls are now only those bordering Venezuela and Brazil.⁴⁷ Moreover, several key leaders have been killed or captured, and the number of desertions of mid-level cadre was reported at 3,027 in 2008, compared to 529 in 2002. Kidnapping victims and terrorist acts are down 87 percent and 82 percent, respectively.⁴⁸ This turn-around has been due to a number of factors, including combined U.S.-Colombian actions under Plan Colombia, and measures taken by President Alvaro Uribe's administration, which have benefited from high-level intelligence penetration of the FARC. To be sure, the FARC is far from defeated; it still supplies about 50 percent of the world's cocaine, for instance, and it appears to be receiving materiel support from Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, who appears to be using it to maintain tensions in Colombia.⁴⁹ The turns are likely to continue; but, the FARC's development of light infantry capabilities and Hezbollah's aspirations to become more than a guerrilla organization notwithstanding, these groups are fine-tuning their ways of war rather than completely changing them.⁵⁰

State Competitors. Like the United States, a number of contemporary state actors maintain some capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. However, we are more likely to see cases in which ways of war are refined rather than changed in a comprehensive or revolutionary way. Advocates of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and network-centric warfare have used the models of Britain and France as examples of states that failed to transform their ways of fighting, at least to the extent Germany purportedly did, in the decades before World War II.⁵¹ Whereas military conservatism was touted as the principal reason for that failure, the real culprits were strong strategic traditions coupled with compelling domestic interests. The British gave greater priority to maintaining naval supremacy, an established strategic tradition for them well before the 20th century; the French put more emphasis on technological innovation, a long-standing cultural strength, in the form of the Maginot Line, which partly also assuaged domestic concerns.⁵²

Interestingly, studies of the 2006 war in Lebanon illustrate that historical forces can exert a correcting influence on military change. Prior to the 2006 campaign, the Israeli army shifted its training and procurement efforts away from conventional, joint combined arms operations toward low-intensity conflict and counterterrorism. However, Hezbollah presented a challenge that required competence in conventional operations. As a result of critical assessments done in the aftermath of the war, the Israeli army shifted its efforts back toward developing competency in joint combined arms operations.⁵³ In short, preferred ways of fighting owe much to the collective force of political, cultural, and geographic influences.

Perhaps a more telling example is China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), which has attempted since the 1980s to modernize while retaining the basic doctrine of People's War, which is characterized by an emphasis on manpower and protracted, but limited, conflict.⁵⁴ The roots of the doctrine do indeed run deep, presumably reaching as far back as the Chinese Red Army's founding in 1927. The doctrine is not without its merits, which were clearly demonstrated in the guerrilla operations it conducted against the Japanese from 1937 to 1945, and then against the army of the Kuomintang from 1945 to 1946, and in the eventual conversion to offensive operations from 1947 to 1950.⁵⁵ In fact, it is not clear that the PLA ever went back to the guerrilla model after converting to offensive operations in 1947; instead, the doctrine of People's War became synonymous with physical and psychological mobilization.⁵⁶

A more consistent theme with respect to reform has been the Chinese army's repeated attempts, and only limited successes, at projecting power and sustaining it over significant distances and for prolonged periods of time. This was the case, for instance, with the force of Chinese "volunteers" that participated in the Korean conflict from 1950 to 1953. By the time the third Chinese offensive was launched on December 31, 1950, severe shortages in food and ammunition and problems with exhaustion, unresponsive command and control structures, and lack of replacements had become acute.⁵⁷ Mao Zedong might have insisted that any battle could be conducted using principles of guerrilla warfare; however, that did not necessarily mean those principles could win wars. In fact, the tactics that initially worked for the Chinese army resemble more those of classic infiltration followed

closely by massed infantry assaults against isolated units; these tactics are not necessarily guerrilla in nature, even under Mao's rather permissive definition of the concept.

Moreover, when Joseph Stalin and Mao most desired a rapid and decisive campaign in the spring of 1951 to push United Nations (UN) forces off the Korean peninsula, the Chinese army was unable to deliver it.⁵⁸ It had neither the doctrinal underpinnings, nor the training, nor the material wherewithal to switch to an entirely different mode of warfare. Ironically, the very characteristics that were thought to be strengths for the Chinese army, namely, its reliance on manpower and psychological motivation, particularly in rugged terrain and severe weather, had become hindrances. It was simply not able to adopt a new approach and overcome those impediments when Mao's political logic asked it to. After the summer of 1951, the Chinese army began to mirror its Western opponents, "maintaining a relatively stable front line; increasing [Chinese People's Volunteer Force] air force, artillery, and tank units; and beefing up logistical support."⁵⁹ In short, its operations became more joint; yet, this change, too, was an evolutionary process, despite the exigencies of modern war.⁶⁰

The defeat of the Tibetan rebellion in 1959 and the successful border war with India in 1962 were relatively quick campaigns for the Chinese army.⁶¹ In the latter, which has been called the "most clear-cut, 'text-book' PLA victory ever outside of Chinese territory," the Chinese army followed a doctrine of maneuver, isolation, and annihilation of enemy units, much as it had in the last phases of the Civil War, and had attempted to do during the "five campaigns" period (1950-51) of the Korean conflict.⁶² However, the PLA's

brief but costly punitive campaign against Vietnam in 1979 is also notable not only for the logistical and communications shortfalls that seem to plague it whenever it attempts to project power much beyond its borders, but also for the PLA's "poor discipline, low morale, combat ineffectiveness, and high casualties."⁶³ In short, the doctrine of People's War has had to become much more elastic than it was when originally conceived by Mao.⁶⁴

Through an evolutionary series of revolutions, the PLA continues to integrate more high-tech weaponry and information technology, as well as a series of "new" doctrinal concepts designed to optimize them in practice; the aim is to achieve a "Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," which ostensibly would enable the PLA to fight "Local War Under the Conditions of Informatization."⁶⁵ Emphasis is on achieving greater jointness to launch focused attacks against purportedly "asymmetric" targets, namely, the principal "combat system of the opponent," so as to erode its cohesion in unexpected ways."⁶⁶ The opponent's "support system" is considered the center of gravity, and neutralizing it is seen as the surest way to offset an unfavorable imbalance in capabilities, and to increase the chances for a "quick, decisive victory."⁶⁷ Interestingly, while this move is a clear departure from early Maoist doctrine, which emphasized isolation and annihilation, it is hardly asymmetric in substance.⁶⁸ Rather, it emulates the technocentric theories developed by U.S. military during the 1990s RMA, which had obvious roots in German operational thinking of the 1930s and 1940s. However, the PLA has not eschewed embracing military operations other than war (MOOTW) as an essential mission set, the accomplishment of which facilitates its expanding regional and global interests.⁶⁹

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has seen little combat action since it was founded in 1949; however, it is also transforming from a continental defense force, which employed "people's war at sea," to a blue water navy, with two aircraft carriers projected for deployment by 2015.⁷⁰ Much speculation surrounds the purposes these carriers might serve—to include protecting sea lines of communication, defending territorial claims, responding to humanitarian and disaster relief crises, and employment in contingencies regarding Taiwan—but the symbolic value they offer as evidence that China has come of age as a naval power is clear.⁷¹ The PLAN's focus still seems to be on developing anti-access strategies; these are designed to deter adversaries from participating in local conflicts by making the costs of intervening too high, militarily and politically. Hence, priority is given to improving "extended-range power projection, long-range precision strike, maritime C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], expeditionary logistics, forward basing."⁷² The former concept of layered coastal defense has obvious roots in the system employed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but does suit Chinese strengths.⁷³ Still, the PLAN is rather short of the estimated 60 modern submarines it would need to fulfill its anti-carrier denial mission, though some suggest that this gap could close by 2020.⁷⁴

Growth within the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) since 1949 has been called "remarkable," less for its size than its direction.⁷⁵ Experts describe its past performance in major conflicts as politically limited or endeavoring to acquire "concrete knowledge" of air operations.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, as new generations of strike and support aircraft, precision-

guided munitions, and modernized C4ISR capabilities are introduced, the PLAAF is increasing its ability to carry out traditional missions, such as air defense and support for ground forces, while also developing the capability to launch offensive strikes against ground and naval targets beyond China's borders.

In sum, the Chinese military appears to be following a modernization trajectory that will turn it into an effective, high-tech, joint military organization, rather than a force that would shift direction and re-embrace the guerrilla model. This path accords with China's efforts to develop a "constant global presence."⁷⁷ As experts note, its direction is more "reflective of aspirations as opposed to current capabilities, but no one can know for sure."⁷⁸ Notably, some military thinkers in China have recently found utility in the phrase "If you want peace, prepare for war."⁷⁹ The message is, evidently, that to secure for itself a peaceful rise to greater power and influence, Beijing must prepare for conflict, especially with the United States, but not only with it.⁸⁰ China must also consider perceived challenges from India, Russia, and Japan, among others.⁸¹ Given the obvious momentum the Chinese military is developing within the realm of conventional warfare and the strategic rationale for it, a major shift in the Chinese way of war is unlikely, though refinement is clearly underway. The United States is, thus, right to concern itself with China's continued development of cyber technology, anti-satellite capabilities, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, ballistic missiles, and bio-genetic technologies, whether these are classified as conventional, unconventional, or asymmetric.⁸² Indeed, with technological innovations reaching unprecedented levels in the 21st century, it is not clear that any form of technology now warrants the title unconventional or asymmetric.

The brief survey here has shown that revolutionary change — that is, moving from one part of the spectrum of conflict to the other — is as rare among nonstate actors as it is among states.⁸³ Small groups, almost by definition, have more difficulty acquiring the resources necessary to fight conventionally. Limiting factors, such as cultural practices and traditions, are just as important for nonstate actors as they are for states. Historically, the stronger inclination is in the direction of adaptation rather than transformation. Evolutionary change also makes sense from the standpoint of managing risk. Nonstate actors and states must contend with an array of threats. Al-Qaeda must compete against other groups within the jihadi movement, and China must take into account not only how best to respond to perceived challenges from the United States, but also to those from India, Russia, and Japan, to mention only the most obvious. In other words, despite the abundance of rhetoric about how flexible and adaptable our foes are, change is not necessarily any easier for them than it is for us.

Even if the U.S. military had not demonstrated its superiority at conventional war in the early 1990s, few of our adversaries would have challenged us in that realm for important political and cultural reasons. Most were employing irregular methods well before the 1990s, a fact that in some ways should make them more dangerous since, presumably, they have had more time to become proficient. They also have every reason to continue to hone their expertise. It is more cost-effective for them to try to find new niche capabilities in those areas where they have already established a foundation of knowledge and capability, rather than to shift to another segment of the spectrum. The evolution of IEDs is a case in point.⁸⁴ The

rub is that our opponents need not change radically to identify and attack any number of our vulnerabilities. Thus, it makes more sense for the U.S. military to approach conventional and irregular warfare not as separate kinds of conflicts, but as different priorities within the larger activity of war itself.⁸⁵ The priority for counterinsurgency operations, for instance, is protection of the population.⁸⁶ A clear understanding of the mission, and its attendant priorities, is always critical.

Terms like “hybrid war” are keen attempts to bring the two kinds warfare together.⁸⁷ However, stripping away the sundry adjectives and viewing wars as war—rather than as battles writ large—would work even better. The many definitions of types of war and the various descriptors we attach to the term “war” suggest we have not yet transitioned from a way of battle to a way of war. We still have difficulty thinking of war holistically, as something multifaceted and dynamic. That resistance movements or insurgencies develop when one belligerent has occupied the territory of another is the rule, not the exception; yet, the adjective irregular suggests the opposite is true. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were not so much examples of preparing for the wrong wars, as much as they were evidence of the tendency to prepare for battles rather than war. That there were not enough forces on hand early enough to provide a hedge against uncertainty, and then to respond to changes in the situation as they developed, was a consequence of many things, not the least of which was a technology focused, battle-centric approach to war. The essence of war may be the violent clash of arms, but war itself is much more.

While the U.S. military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle, it is still developing fluency in the language of war. Embracing the preparation paradox would only harm this effort. As we have seen, the premises of the paradox are invalid; however, they have contributed to shaping many of the debates within defense circles today. For that reason, it is important to examine them, and to understand why they are faulty. Just as the saying “If you want peace, prepare for war” is little more than an irony, so too is its modern-day complement “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.” Neither can really serve as a guide for action. The problem is that some propositions remain persuasive long after they have been stripped of any semblance of logic.

ENDNOTES

1. From the Latin: *Si vis pacem, parati para bellum*; the origins of the saying are unclear, though credit is usually given to Vegetius. This monograph is based on a paper prepared for Unified Quest (UQ) 2010 on the topic of anticipating tomorrow’s challenges. Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1987, p. 4; in the revised and expanded edition, 2001, p. 2.

2. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Remarks Delivered at the Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting, October 10, 2007; and “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Non-linearity Instruments of American Power,” *Military Review*, Vol. 88, No. 1, January-February 2008, p. 6; Speech to the National Defense University, September 20, 2008, available from www.cfr.org/publication/17411. The label “irregular warfare” is a problematic one; it includes but is not limited to guerrilla and terrorist tactics. See Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, and Thomas S. Szayna, *Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2008. The term “nonstate actors” is also problematic; but since its use has become widespread within defense circles, it is retained here. For

examples of the argument, see John A. Nagl, "Afghanistan and American Grand Strategy: Winning the Wars We're In," paper presented at the Consortium on Grand Strategy, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Philadelphia, PA, November 19, 2009; and Thomas Mahnken, "Modern War," in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., *The Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise*, Westport, CT, and London, UK: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 21.

3. *U.S. National Defense Strategy*, Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008, pp. 4, 13; see also the 2004 *U.S. National Military Strategy*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 5:

Adversaries increasingly seek asymmetric capabilities and will use them in innovative ways. They will avoid US strengths like precision strike and seek to counter US power projection capabilities by creating anti-access environments. Such adversaries will target civilian populations, economic centers and symbolic locations as a way to attack U.S. political will and resolve.

Likewise, the 2005 *National Defense Strategy*, Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 2: "The U.S. military predominates in the world of *traditional* forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United States through *traditional* military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods."

4. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010, p. 42.

5. Roy Sorensen, *A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

6. W. V. Quine, *Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 1.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

9. For recent attempts, see J. C. Beall, ed., *Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2007.

10. Luttwak, pp. 32-49; see also the interview at the Carnegie Council with Joanne Myers, available from www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/128.html.

11. Luttwak, p. 18.

12. Luttwak, p. 21.

13. For more on the 1940 campaign, see Robert A. Dougherty, *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France*, Hamden, CT: Archon, 1990; Dennis Showalter, "German Operational Art," in John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld, eds., *Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2010.

14. Omar Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

15. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2000, pp. 451-54.

16. Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University, 2005, pp. 709-711.

17. D. Clayton James, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953*, New York: Free Press, 1993, pp. 218-220.

18. Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1978, shows that even Alexander the Great's art of war involved a great deal of science.

19. Antulio J. Echevarria II, "The Arms Race: Qualitative and Quantitative Dimensions," in Roger Chickering and Dennis Showalter, eds., *Cambridge History of War*, Vol. 4, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University, 2010. See also Craig Etcheson, *Arms Race Theory: Strategy and Structure of Behavior*, New York: Greenwood, 1989; Paul M. Kennedy, ed., *The War Plans of the Great Powers*,

1880-1914, Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1985; Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Ashfield, 1987; Robert K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War*, New York: Ballantine, 1992; David Stevenson, *Armaments and the Coming of the War: Europe, 1904-1914*, New York: Oxford University, 1996; David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1996.

20. Joseph Maiolo, *Cry Havoc: How the Arms Race Drove the World to War 1931-1941*, New York: Basic Books, 2010.

21. Nicholas Rescher, *Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution*, Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2001, p. 7.

22. Carl Conetta, *An Undisciplined Defense: Understanding the \$2 Trillion Surge in US Defense Spending*, Project on Defense Alternatives, Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, January 18, 2010.

23. Max Manwaring, *State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible Midwives of New Social Orders*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, p. 33.

24. See Thomas Hegghammer, "The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 9, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, pp. 26-45:

Revolutionary discourse stresses the perceived or actual injustices of the Muslim ruler and tends to list a range of grievances including secular legislation, corruption, repression, and treason to the cause of Islam and the Muslim Nation. Global jihadist discourse reemphasizes the suffering of Muslims at the hands of non-Muslims, and is recognizable by long enumerations of occupations, alleged massacres, prisoner humiliation and blasphemy by non-Muslims against Muslims.

The group's aims include forcing the United States from Muslim holy lands, deposing apostate regimes, uniting the Muslim community and restoring the Caliphate, securing regional resources, and imposing Sharia. Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al-Qai'da*

Reader, New York: Broadway Books, 2007, available from Usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/99129502.html.

25. The brief and unsuccessful life of the “055 Brigade (or 55th Arab Brigade)” strengthens the point that radical change is difficult to accomplish. Information about the 055 Brigade’s exact organization and equipment is sketchy, but most sources indicate that it fought with a blend of guerrilla and conventional tactics and was later incorporated into the Taliban army. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, New York: Penguin, 2004; and *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century*, New York: Penguin, 2008.

26. There are numerous sources available now, compared to a decade ago, See Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, and Jim Lacey, *The Terrorist Perspective Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008; Jeffery B. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function, Culture, and Grand Strategy,” in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction*, London, UK: Routledge, 2007, pp. 127-164; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda*, London, UK: C. Hurst & Co, 2002; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2004; and *Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2008; Bruce Riedel, *The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008; Michael A. Scheuer, *Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam After Iraq*, New York: Free Press, 2008; “Al-Qai’da Insurgency Doctrine: Aiming for a Long War,” Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, February 28, 2006; Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2009.

27. Cori M. Dauber, *YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras and Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009.

28. Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, *Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook*, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006.

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33. Phil Williams, *Criminal, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, p. x.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 16. Presumably, Saddam's release of 75,000 to 100,000 criminals from Iraq's prisons in 2002 gave organized crime in Iraq a shot in the arm as well; see W. Andrew Terrill, *Regional Spillover Effects of the Iraq War*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009.

35. Manwaring, *Contemporary Challenge*, p. 2.

36. Defense Intelligence Testimony, available from www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/Test05-07-28Temple.doc; cf. Williams, *Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents*, pp. 221-224. See also Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al-Qaeda*, New York: Thomas Dunne, 2009.

37. Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, New Haven: Yale University, 2009, pp. 213-258.

38. Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2006; see also his interview with Joanne J. Myers, Carnegie Council, June 6, 2006, available from www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5376.html, from which the quote was taken.

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44. Marks, *Columbian Army Adaptation*, p. 7.

45. Rafael Pardo, "Colombia," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2000.

46. Max Boot and Richard Bennet, "The Colombian Miracle: How Alvaro Uribe with Smart U.S. Support Turned the Tide against Drug Lords and Marxist Guerrillas," *Weekly Standard*, December 14, 2009, Vol. 15, No. 13.

47. Admiral James G. Stavridis, *U.S. Southern Command 2008 Posture Statement: Partnership for the Americas*, delivered to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, 2008, p. 15; see also Stephanie Hanson, "FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-wing Guerrillas," August 19, 2009, available from www.cfr.org/publication/9272/.

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55. Larry M. Wortzel, "The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign of 1948-1949: The Strategic and Operational Thinking of the People's Liberation Army," in *Chinese Warfighting*, pp. 56-72.

56. Dennis J. Blasko, "Chinese Strategic Thinking: People's War in the 21st Century," *China Brief*, Vol. X, issue 6, March 18, 2010, p. 12; *The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century*, London, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2006.

57. Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, pp. 100-101; Shu Guang Zhang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea, 1950-1951," in *Chinese Warfighting*, pp. 105-106.

58. It was not until late spring 1951 that Chinese leaders finally accepted the idea that the war would have to be protracted. Zhang, "Command, Control, and the PLA's Offensive Campaigns in Korea, 1950-1951," pp. 112.

59. Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, p. 105.

60. The Korean conflict, particularly the first 8 months, served as a key basis for the PLA's doctrinal reform efforts in the 1980s. Yu Bin, "What China Learned from its 'Forgotten War' in Korea," in *Chinese Warfighting*, pp. 123-142.

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62. David M. Finkelstein, "Patterns of PLA Warfighting," in *Chinese Warfighting*, p. 10; see also Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, "PLA Operational Principles and Limited War: The Sino-Indian War of 1962," in *Chinese Warfighting*, pp. 173-197.

63. Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, p. 258.

64. For further examples, see Andrew Scobell, "Chinese Operational Art," in Olsen and Creveld, eds., *Operational Art from Napoleon to the Present*.

65. The years 1996-2000, for instance, were the period of the "9th Five-Year Plan." David M. Finkelstein, "Thinking about the PLA's 'Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs,'" in James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein, eds., *China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, Washington, DC: CNA Corp., 2004, pp. 1-28; Blasko, *Chinese Army Today*, pp. 13, 91-120.

66. Jiangxiang Bi, "Joint Operations: Developing a New Paradigm," in *China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs*, pp. 29-78.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-64.

68. At the same time, it should not be assumed that the search for an opponent's center of gravity would proceed only along military lines, and exclude legal and economic systems, which is a point made in Senior Colonel Qiao Liang and Senior Colonel Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing, China: People's Liberation Army, 1999. It is also worth noting that the PLA is establishing two armor corps similar in design and concept to the 1980s-style Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups, which were intended for breakthrough and exploitation operations. The force is too heavy for amphibious landings, and might be meant to operate in Central Asia, perhaps to seize oilfields. Martin Andrew, "How the PLA Fights—Weapons and Tactics of the People's Liberation Army," Report for the Australian Department of Army,

August 5, 2008; cf. Ryan Clarke, *The Myth of the PLAN's Frontline Status*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

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70. One additional carrier was purchased from Ukraine in 1998, and is undergoing refurbishment; it is projected to be operational between 2010 and 2012. *People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics*, Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009, p. 19.

71. Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 63, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 13-32.

72. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008, pp. 5, 13, 16. While China's progress is always noted, its import is often challenged. See Fred Kaplan, "The China Syndrome: Why the Pentagon Keeps Overestimating Beijing's Military Strength," *Slate*, May 26, 2006, available from www.slate.com/id/2141966/?nav=tap3.

73. Alexander C. Huang, "The PLA Navy at War, 1949-1999," in *Chinese Warfighting*, pp. 243-244.

74. Clarke, *Myth of PLAN*, p. 38.

75. Xiaoming Zhang, "Air Combat for the People's Republic: The People's Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949-1969," in *Chinese Warfighting*, pp. 270-94.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

77. *Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics*, pp. 42-45.

78. Finkelstein, "Thinking about the PLA's 'Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs,'" p. 7. It is worth noting that reform efforts in all branches tend to exacerbate tensions between professionalism and party loyalty, among other things. Lae Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel, eds., *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003.

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